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A FAIR USE TO REMEMBER:  RESTORING 
APPLICATION OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE TO 
STRENGTHEN COPYRIGHT LAW AND DISARM 
ABUSIVE COPYRIGHT LITIGATION 
Lauren Gorab* 
 
The primary goal of copyright law is to benefit the public.  By rewarding 
authors with exclusive rights, such as the power to enforce copyright 
infringement, copyright protection is the means through which copyright law 
accomplishes this goal.  Another way that copyright law pursues its goal is 
through the fair use doctrine—an invaluable utilitarian limit on copyright 
protection.  However, fair use is, among other things, vague.  The current 
application of fair use as an affirmative defense magnifies the doctrine’s 
problems and makes copyright law hospitable to abusive copyright litigation. 
Current proposals in this area of reform target either fair use or abusive 
copyright litigation.  This Note targets both problems with a single solution:  
applying fair use as a right.  Applying fair use as a right alleviates some of 
the doctrine’s inherent problems and is the best long-term solution for 
eliminating abusive litigation from copyright law.  As a right, fair use 
protects copyright’s core values and goals, alleviates the burden on courts, 
and cultivates creation.  A review of the motivation behind fair use reveals 
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INTRODUCTION 
Copyright law’s raison d’être is to promote the creation of new works to 
benefit the public because creative activity “is vital to the well-being of 
society.”1  To secure the benefit of creative works for the public and 
incentivize future creation, copyright protection provides authors2 with 
limited monopoly rights over their creations.3  Copyright law also pursues its 
goal through the fair use doctrine, which states that certain secondary uses4 
qualifying as “fair use” are not copyright infringement.5 
 
 1. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1990). 
 2. This Note uses the terms “author” or “creator” to describe the original maker of a 
copyrightable work. 
 3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Niva Elkin-Koren, The New Frontiers of User Rights, 
32 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1, 16 (2016); see also Leval, supra note 1, at 1109 (calling copyright 
protection “a pragmatic measure”). 
 4. A “secondary use” is an unauthorized use of part or whole of a copyrighted work.  For 
example, a news article quoting from a published book is a secondary use of the copyrighted 
work.  A modern-art collage including a reproduction of a famous painting still under 
copyright is also a secondary use. 
 5. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16; Leval, supra note 1, at 
1127; Sepehr Shahshahani, The Nirvana Fallacy in Fair Use Reform, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & 
TECH. 273, 276–77 (2015). 
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Fair use limits the exclusive rights of copyright owners.6  It embodies the 
balance between private ownership and public access, and it applies across 
copyright law.7  Currently, the application of fair use as an affirmative 
defense magnifies the doctrine’s inherent problems and makes copyright law 
hospitable to abusive copyright litigation.8  The prevalence of abusive 
copyright litigation also illuminates weaknesses in copyright law.9  Abusive 
copyright litigation exploits the courts, frustrates copyright protection, 
weakens copyright law, and chills free speech.10 
Commentators have offered proposals targeting either the fair use doctrine 
or abusive copyright litigation, but these solutions approach the problems 
separately.11  This Note argues that the problems are connected and therefore 
proposes a single solution:  applying fair use as a right.  This proposal simply 
changes the procedural application of fair use.  Applying fair use as a right 
will fix some of the problems within the doctrine itself and is also the best 
long-term solution for mitigating abusive copyright litigation.  In addition, 
when compared to other proposals, this proposal requires the least change by 
the fewest parties.  As a right, fair use protects copyright’s fundamental 
values and goals, alleviates the burden on courts, and cultivates creation. 
Applying fair use as an affirmative defense misplaces the burden on the 
defendant and makes copyright law legally and procedurally hospitable to 
abusive copyright litigation.12  Instead, fair use should be applied as a right 
held by users making fair use of a copyrighted work.  Thus, fair use must be 
considered during pleading, when the initial determination of copyright 
infringement is made.  Applying fair use as a right is the best approach to the 
problems caused by the inherent uncertainty in the fair use doctrine and by 
abusive copyright litigation because this solution reduces the potential for 
abuse in copyright enforcement. 
 
 6. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“Limitations on exclusive rights:  Fair use.”). 
 7. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16; Leval, supra note 1, at 1127 (describing fair use 
as a “judge-made utilitarian limit” on statutory copyright); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. 
Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. REV. 1483, 1495 (2007) (calling fair use “perhaps the 
most crucial policy tool for maintaining copyright’s intended balance”); see also Suntrust 
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he fair use right 
was codified to maintain the constitutionally mandated balance to ensure that the public has 
access to knowledge.”). 
 8. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 99 (2004); see also Ned Snow, The Forgotten 
Right of Fair Use, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 135, 169 (2011). 
 9. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Uneasy Case Against Copyright Trolls, 86 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 723, 780 (2013). 
 10. See Elif Sonmez, Copyright Troll or Ugly Rights Holder?  The Spread of Troll-Tactics 
and Solutions to the Abuse of the Courts and Degradation of the Copyright Protection Scheme, 
19 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 137, 138 (2015). 
 11. See Luke S. Curran, Note, Copyright Trolls, Defining the Line Between Legal Ransom 
Letters and Defending Digital Rights:  Turning Piracy into a Business Model or Protecting 
Creative from Internet Lawlessness?, 13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 170, 194 (2013); 
see also infra Part II. 
 12. See infra Part I.D.3 (explaining how abusive copyright litigation capitalizes on the 
vagueness of fair use). 
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I.  COPYRIGHT LAW:  PAST, PRESENT, AND THE PLACE OF THE FAIR USE 
DOCTRINE 
The goal of copyright law is to provide the public with intellectual and 
artistic creation.  Copyright protection incentivizes creation by granting 
authors limited monopoly rights over their work.13  The fair use doctrine is 
also essential to the copyright mechanism because it increases access to 
copyrighted works and limits the scope of copyright protection.14  Yet 
weaknesses in these two features of the copyright design—the copyright 
monopoly and the fair use doctrine—allow disingenuous copyright owners 
to exploit copyright law.15 
A.  The Copyright Design 
In 1790, the constitutional framers canonized the principle of copyright 
protection in the Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution.16  The Clause’s 
statement of purpose communicates copyright’s primary goals:  “To promote 
the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”17  This statement of purpose 
embodies the idea that public benefits are generated “through the creation 
and publication of free expression.”18  The Clause then grants Congress the 
power to achieve this goal “by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”19  
Providing authors with copyright protection, and thus economic rights, is an 
incentive to create and produce, which in turn generates activity and progress 
in the arts and sciences for the public’s intellectual enrichment.20 
The economic philosophy underlying copyright law is that the “best way 
to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 
‘Science and useful Arts’” is by encouraging individual creation through 
personal gain.21  Therefore, copyright law protects authors to incentivize 
future creation, which then benefits the public.22  The U.S. Supreme Court 
has consistently stated that copyright’s fundamental goal is securing public 
benefit.23  Accordingly, copyright protection is neither an individual nor a 
natural right; it derives solely from statutes and applies only when certain 
 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16. 
 14. Leval, supra note 1, at 1110. 
 15. See infra Parts I.C–D. 
 16. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Curran, supra note 11, at 173; see also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003). 
 19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 20. Leval, supra note 1, at 1107. 
 21. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954). 
 22. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985).  
Copyright’s immediate impact is rewarding authors for their creative labor, but copyright’s 
ultimate goal, through the reward-incentive, is to encourage “[the creation of useful works] 
for the general public good.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Twentieth Century Music 
Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)). 
 23. See, e.g., Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156. 
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conditions are met.24  Moreover, copyright protection is limited;25 an 
author’s control over his work is not absolute or perpetual.26 
B.  Modern Copyright Law:  Protection, Rights, Remedies 
The modern copyright statute is the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “1976 
Act”).27  The 1976 Act changed several aspects of copyright law and added 
§ 107, which codified the fair use doctrine.28  To be eligible for copyright 
protection, a work must be original.29  Neither facts nor ideas are eligible for 
copyright protection.30  Once a work receives copyright protection, the owner 
has a bundle of exclusive rights concerning the work.31  An owner can also 
sell or license these exclusive rights individually or collectively.32 
With rights come remedies, and copyright law provides owners with 
remedies for infringement of their copyrights.33  Owners may bring 
infringement actions against anyone who violates any of their exclusive 
rights.34  The Act provides two damages remedies:  actual damages35 and 
statutory damages.36  If an owner establishes that their copyright was 
willfully infringed, the court may award additional statutory damages of up 
 
 24. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1108. 
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 26. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1107. 
 27. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).  The Act was the product of “a major legislative 
reexamination of copyright doctrine.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 552. 
 28. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012). 
 29. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991) (“[O]riginality 
requires independent creation plus a modicum of creativity . . . .” (citing The Trade-Mark 
Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879))). 
 30. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  The idea-expression distinction—expressions of ideas are 
copyrightable while ideas themselves are not—respects the First Amendment and copyright 
law by allowing facts to be freely communicated “while still protecting an author’s 
expression.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 556. 
 31. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 139.  The bundle includes the right to publish, 
reproduce, adapt, distribute, display, or perform the work. 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 32. See id. §§ 106, 201(d)(2).  The divisibility of the bundle confers standing on any owner 
or licensee of a right, allowing them to enforce infringement of that right. See id.  “Standing” 
or “standing to sue” under federal law means that a party has the “right to make a legal claim 
or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right.” Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th 
ed. 2014).  Standing requires a plaintiff to show:  “(1) that the challenged conduct has caused 
[him] actual injury, and (2) that the interest sought to be protected is within the zone of 
interests meant to be regulated by the statutory or constitutional guarantee in question.” Id.  
Here, standing means the right to bring copyright infringement claims. 
 33. See 17 U.S.C. § 501. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. § 504(b).  Actual damages are any damages the copyright owner incurs due to the 
infringement plus any profits the infringer earned. See Curran, supra note 11, at 174–75. 
 36. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1).  An owner can seek statutory damages between $750 and 
$30,000 per infringed work. Id. 
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to $150,000.37  Copyright owners may also seek injunctions38 or request the 
impounding and destruction of infringing works.39 
Because authors can sell any of their exclusive rights, it is common that 
the party alleging copyright infringement—enforcing infringement of an 
exclusive right and seeking a remedy—is not the original author of the 
work.40  An owner’s motivation for enforcing infringement of their right does 
not matter.41  What does matter is that the owner’s rights “extend only to the 
limits of the copyright.”42 
C.  The Fair Use Doctrine 
The fair use doctrine limits the exclusive rights of copyright holders43 by 
exempting users from copyright infringement if the user can show that their 
unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is sufficiently fair to avoid liability.44  
Technically, a secondary user making “fair use” of a copyrighted work need 
not obtain the owner’s permission to use the work.45  Limiting authors’ 
exclusive rights ensures that secondary users have access to copyrighted 
materials.46  Access to copyrighted materials furthers copyright’s 
fundamental goal of public enrichment by allowing users to “exercise their 
rights to freedom of expression, education, and cultural participation.”47  Fair 
use is intentionally flexible and highly case specific, which allows it to adapt 
to a variety of copyright cases.48 
 
 37. Id. § 504(c)(2).  But the court also has discretion to reduce a statutory damages award 
if the infringer proves that he was not aware nor had any reason to believe that his conduct 
was copyright infringement. See id. 
 38. Id. § 502. 
 39. Id. § 503. 
 40. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 139–40. 
 41. Leval, supra note 1, at 1128 (“[T]he copyright owner may sue to protect what he owns, 
regardless of his motivation.”). 
 42. Id. 
 43. 17 U.S.C. § 107; see Leval, supra note 1, at 1128 (“As fair use is not an infringement, 
[the owner] has no power over it.”). 
 44. See Haochen Sun, Fair Use as a Collective User Right, 90 N.C. L. REV. 125, 144 
(2011). 
 45. See Ned Snow, Fair Use as a Matter of Law, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2011). 
 46. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 6; Sun, supra note 44, at 144. 
 47. Sun, supra note 44, at 144. 
 48. Snow, supra note 45, at 4. 
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1.  History and Doctrine 
Although the fair use doctrine was not codified until 1976, it was first 
introduced into American copyright law in 1841.49  In Folsom v. Marsh,50 
Justice Joseph Story explained that certain secondary uses of copyrighted 
materials displayed such independent creation that they did not constitute 
infringement.51  To evaluate this type of use, Justice Story articulated an oft-
cited approach to questions of fair use:  “[W]e must often . . . look to the 
nature and objects of the selections made, the quantity and value of the 
materials used, and the degree in which the use may prejudice the sale, or 
diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”52  The 
fair use doctrine continued as exclusively judge-made law until the Copyright 
Act of 1976.53  Both the House and Senate reports stated that § 107 was 
designed to track the preexisting judge-created fair use doctrine, “not to 
change, narrow, or enlarge [fair use] in any way.”54  In Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises,55 the Supreme Court cited Professor 
Alan Latman’s commentary of common-law fair use to help explain the 
analysis, which asks, “would the reasonable copyright owner have consented 
to the use?”56 
The fair use doctrine is critically important to copyright law.57  Fair use is 
a fundamental policy of copyright law because it represents copyright’s 
central balance between monopoly protection and public benefit.58  The 
 
 49. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901); see 
Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 276.  Fair use appeared a century earlier in English courts of 
equity. See Gyles v. Wilcox (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490 (proposing “fair abridgement”).  
The principle of fair use is said to be as old as copyright itself. See Matthew Sag, The 
Prehistory of Fair Use, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1371, 1410 (2011).  The Supreme Court has 
described fair use as an “equitable rule of reason” developed by judges. Stewart v. Abend, 495 
U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, 448 (1984)).  But see Leval, supra note 1, at 1127 (countering that fair use is a judge-
made limit on statutory copyright, not the product of equity). 
 50. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 51. Id. at 345. 
 52. Id. 
 53. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); Leval, supra note 
1, at 1105; see also Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and Presumptively Fair Uses, 85 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 53, 92 (2014). 
 54. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 66 (1976); S. REP. NO. 94-473, at 62 (1975). 
 55. 417 U.S. 539 (1985). 
 56. Id. at 550 (citing ALAN LATMAN, STUDY NO. 14 FAIR USE OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 
(March 1958), in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS & COPYRIGHTS, 86TH CONG., 
COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 1, 15 (Comm. Print 1960)). 
 57. Scholars unanimously agree. See, e.g., Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 273 (calling fair 
use “possibly the most important doctrine in all of copyright”); Sun, supra note 44, at 127 
(“Fair use is of vital importance in a free and just society.”); see also Michael J. Madison, 
Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 391, 
392 (2005) (“The world is a better place in some small measure because fair use enables it to 
be so.”). 
 58. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1135–36; see also Madison, supra note 57, at 392 
(explaining that “fair use matters to copyright law” because it prevents copyright protection 
from becoming limitless). 
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doctrine protects overbroad grants of monopoly rights,59 safeguards access 
to knowledge,60 has “built-in First Amendment accommodations,”61 and is 
highly adaptable.62 
2.  17 U.S.C. § 107:  The Fair Use Factors 
Fair use’s flexibility is a well-recognized strength.63  First, § 107 labels 
fair use as a limitation on exclusive rights.64  It then explains that fair use of 
a copyrighted work can be made for “criticism, comment, news reporting, 
teaching . . . , scholarship, or research.”65  Each fair use analysis is highly 
case specific and is determined by evaluating the four factors listed in 
§ 107.66  These four enumerated factors require courts to look at fair use from 
all relevant angles and ask whether a finding of fair use furthers copyright’s 
goals.67  Each factor represents a different consideration pertaining to the 
determination of fairness, and the factors collectively help determine whether 
the secondary use at issue constitutes infringement.68  The factors represent 
the common-law principles that judges established to evaluate necessary 
limitations on copyright infringement.69  No single factor is dispositive, and 
the factors need not be weighted equally.70 
 
 59. See Leval, supra note 1, at 1109.  Excessive copyright protections are problematic 
because they strangle the creative process, impede referential analysis, and stifle the 
development of new ideas from old ideas. See id. 
 60. Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 16–17; see, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 
F.3d 87, 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2014). 
 61. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003); see Sun, supra note 44, at 127.  Fair 
use “accommodates [and] encourages a wide range of freedom-promoting activities that 
involve using copyrighted works for purposes such as news reporting, criticism, teaching, and 
research.” Sun, supra note 44, at 127. 
 62. See id. at 202 (“History [shows] that fair use is a highly dynamic legal tool.”).  Fair 
use has evolved over time by adapting to changing technologies and social conditions. See 
Dan L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 46–47 (2001); Sun, supra note 44, at 202 (“No matter how fair use 
changes, what remains unchanged is its capacity to generate active responses and adaptations 
to new public needs.”). 
 63. See Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2540 
(2009). 
 64. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also id. § 106 (“Exclusive rights in copyrighted 
works.”). 
 65. Id. § 107. 
 66. Id.; see Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985); 
Snow, supra note 45, at 4. 
 67. Leval, supra note 1, at 1110–11. 
 68. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . is not an infringement of 
copyright.”); see Snow, supra note 45, at 4 (explaining that the fair use doctrine “follows 
general principles that guide the analysis of determining fairness”).  The statutory factors 
reflect Justice Story’s articulation. Compare Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. 
Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901), with 17 U.S.C. § 107.  For further discussion, see Leval, supra note 
1, at 1110–25 (comparing § 107 to Folsom). 
 69. Snow, supra note 45, at 4 (stating that the factors represent fair use principles 
developed over two hundred years). 
 70. See Harper & Row, 417 U.S. at 560; see also Snow, supra note 45, at 4. 
2018] A FAIR USE TO REMEMBER 711 
“Factor One is the soul of fair use.”71  This first factor examines “the 
purpose and character of the [secondary] use”:  the degree to which the 
secondary use transforms the original work, the justification for the use, and 
whether the secondary use is for a commercial purpose or a nonprofit 
educational purpose.72  A finding of fair use turns, in part, on the degree to 
which the secondary use is “transformative,”73 how productive the use is, and 
whether it uses the copyrighted material in a different way or for a different 
purpose than the original.74  Compared to a nonprofit purpose, a commercial 
secondary use is more likely to weigh against a finding of fair use, although 
a commercial purpose alone does not defeat fair use.75 
Factor two examines the nature of the copyrighted work.76  This factor 
reviews the purpose of the original work and aims to protect “the incentives 
of authorship” by suggesting “that certain types of copyrighted material are 
more amenable to fair use than others.”77  The fair use analysis differentiates 
between creative works intended for publication and private documents 
never intended for publication.78  Factor two protects reasonable expectations 
of creators and authors of the type of works that “copyright seeks to 
encourage.”79  Thus, works intended for publication are more deserving of 
protection against a finding of fair use than works intended only for private 
purposes.80 
The third factor examines “the amount and substantiality of the portion [of 
the work] used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”81  Factor 
three bears directly on the analysis under factor one because the portion used 
must correspond to the proffered justification; the means (the selection and 
quantity) must match the ends (the transformative justification).82  First, the 
portion used must correspond to the justification articulated under factor one; 
the means (the selection and quantity) must match the ends (the 
 
 71. Leval, supra note 1, at 1116. 
 72. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1); see Snow, supra note 45, at 4. 
 73. Judge Pierre N. Leval of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals developed the 
“transformative” requirement, finding support in early judicial opinions. See Leval, supra note 
1, at 1111 (discussing Gyles v. Wilcox and Folsom v. Marsh).  Judge Leval’s contribution to 
the fair use analysis was a critical development in fair use jurisprudence. See, e.g., Campbell 
v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (endorsing Judge Leval’s position and 
emphasizing the importance of “transformativeness”). 
 74. Leval, supra note 1, at 1111.  Examples of transformative uses include parody, 
symbolism, and criticism. Id. 
 75. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562. 
 76. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2). 
 77. Leval, supra note 1, at 1116; see Snow, supra note 45, at 4. 
 78. Leval, supra note 1, at 1116–17. 
 79. Id. at 1122. 
 80. Id. 
 81. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3).  The amount used depends on the context.  For example, a 
secondary use of one line from a haiku differs from a secondary use of one sentence from a 
novel.  Similarly, a secondary use of a single, crucial sentence from a novel differs from a 
secondary use of multiple pages of inconsequential text. Leval, supra note 1, at 1123; accord 
Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 565–66 (1985). 
 82. Leval, supra note 1, at 1123. 
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transformative justification).83  In addition, factor three can help determine 
the secondary use’s market impact under factor four.84  The amount of the 
copyrighted work used aids in determining market impact because as the 
amount of the copyrighted work taken increases, so too does the likely impact 
on the owner’s market.85  Judge Pierre Leval has urged courts to determine 
the importance of factor three by considering copyright’s goals by asking:  
What is the use’s justification, and will it negatively impact the benefits of 
authorship?86 
Finally, factor four examines whether the secondary use impacts the 
potential market for, or the actual value of, the original work.87  Factor four 
protects the benefits of authorship in order to incentivize future creation.  A 
secondary use that materially interferes with the market for the original work 
weighs strongly against fair use.88  However, a secondary use that does not 
substantially impact the original work’s market does not automatically favor 
fair use.89  Market impact must weigh against the secondary user when it 
considerably weakens the incentive to create works for publication.90  Above 
all else, a secondary use must be justified.91 
In sum, the secondary use must stimulate productive thought and public 
education without impairing the incentives for future creation.92  Most 
importantly, analysis of each factor, and additional questions relevant to the 
fair use inquiry, must be answered by reference to the central principles of 
copyright law.93 
3.  Applying the Fair Use Factors 
The application of fair use is a highly fact-specific process.94  Analyzing 
fair use requires identifying the evidentiary facts, applying the four factors to 
 
 83. See id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 1124. 
 87. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2012).  The Supreme Court has called factor four the most 
important fair use factor. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566 
(1985).  Judge Leval, on the other hand, suggests that the Court might have overstated the 
importance of factor four. Leval, supra note 1, at 1124. 
 88. Id.  For example, in Harper & Row, The Nation magazine published only about 300 
copyrighted words from President Ford’s unpublished memoirs. 471 U.S. at 539.  Yet those 
words constituted “the heart of the [memoir],” id. at 565, and The Nation’s secondary use 
substantially impacted the market for the original memoir and the market for the Time article 
which had a contract for first publication, and therefore weighed heavily against a finding of 
fair use, id. at 566–69. 
 89. Leval, supra note 1, at 1124 (explaining that lack of market harm does not assure “that 
the secondary use is justified”). 
 90. Id. at 1125. 
 91. Id. at 1124. 
 92. Id. at 1110. 
 93. Id. 
 94. See id.; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) 
(describing the distinctions in copyright as “very subtile and refined, and, sometimes, almost 
evanescent”).  Likewise, § 107 merely guides fair use, it does not attempt to define it and it 
does not offer a rule that can be mechanically applied to decide whether a particular use is fair. 
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those facts, producing inferences weighing for or against the fairness of the 
secondary use, and weighing the inferences to determine whether the use is 
fair.95  Consequently, no weighing of inferences in any two fair use cases 
will be alike.96  Each fair use analysis is fact dependent.  For example, in 
2008 a video designer photographed Scream Icon, a street-art drawing, and 
used a slightly altered version in a video backdrop at several concerts for the 
band Green Day.97  The court rejected the artist’s infringement claims, 
holding that the video backdrop was fair use because it was transformative 
and did not impact the value of Scream Icon or the artist’s work in general.98 
Currently, courts apply fair use as an affirmative defense, as dictated by 
Supreme Court precedent.99  The Court first labeled fair use an affirmative 
defense in 1985,100 reaffirmed the label in 1994,101 and solidified its position 
in 2003.102  In 1992, when Congress amended § 107, it adopted the Court’s 
1985 opinion by calling fair use an affirmative defense and adding that 
defendants always bear the burden of proving fair use.103  Some scholars 
argue that the application of fair use as an affirmative defense has profoundly 
impacted how the § 107 factors are applied in practice.104 
Fair use operates as an affirmative defense as follows:  First, the plaintiff 
must plead a prima facie case of copyright infringement, which only requires 
the plaintiff to show that he owns a valid copyright and that the defendant 
exercised one of the plaintiff’s exclusive rights.105  The current federal 
pleading standard was articulated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly106 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal,107 which heightened the pleading burden on plaintiffs who 
 
See 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] (Matthew 
Bender & Co. rev. ed. 2018).  This is also exactly what Congress intended. See H.R. REP. NO. 
94-1476, at 66 (1976) (explaining that the infinite number of situations and circumstances that 
can arise in a case precludes establishing exact rules in § 107); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448–49 n.31 (1984) (“[Congress] eschewed a rigid, 
bright-line approach to fair use.”).  The Court has consistently affirmed that § 107 is “not to 
be simplified with bright-line rules.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 
(1994). 
 95. Snow, supra note 45, at 4–5. 
 96. Id. at 6. 
 97. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1174 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 98. Id. at 1177–79. 
 99. See Sun, supra note 44, at 141. 
 100. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985) (finding 
that the drafters of § 107 structured the statute “as an affirmative defense requiring a case-by-
case analysis”). 
 101. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 572, 590 n.20 (1994) (citing 
Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 561, to support the proposition that “fair use is an affirmative 
defense”). 
 102. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219–20 (2003) (calling fair use a constitutionally 
required affirmative defense). 
 103. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-836, at 3 & n.3 (1992). 
 104. See Sun, supra note 44, at 136–37. 
 105. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087, 1099 (2007). 
 106. 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 107. 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
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must now show that their claims are “plausible.”108  Next, the defendant must 
prove, as an affirmative defense, that his use was fair use.  Under Twombly 
and Iqbal, defendants, who are already required to raise and plead fair use in 
their answers,109 must raise fair use in their answers and allege sufficient 
facts to make fair use plausible.110  Failing to do so may cause the court to 
grant a motion to strike the fair use defense.111  Judges can (and do) decide 
fair use as a matter of law, which ends the case before trial.112  Allowing 
judges to decide fair use as a matter of law comports with the fact that judges 
invented and developed fair use.113 
4.  Problems in Fair Use 
Because the fair use doctrine is a highly fact-specific factor test, it is 
primarily criticized for offering little to no guidance in practical application.  
Due to this lack of guidance, fair use is also criticized for producing varied 
outcomes across cases.  Another niche line of criticism identifies the 
problems specifically caused by applying fair use as an affirmative defense. 
The fair use doctrine’s flexibility is both a strength and a weakness.114  The 
primary criticism of fair use is that it is too vague115 and, therefore, that the 
 
 108. Compare Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, with FED. R. CIV. P. 
8(a).  See generally RHJ Med. Ctr., Inc. v. City of DuBois, 754 F. Supp. 2d 723, 730 (W.D. 
Pa. 2010) (“There is a ‘new sheriff in town’ now policing [the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure], and his name is ‘Twiqbal.’”).  Many lower courts apply the standard of Twombly 
and Iqbal to affirmative defenses. See Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use:  An Affirmative Defense?, 
90 WASH. L. REV. 685, 705–06 (2015). 
 109. A party must raise any claims or affirmative defenses in a responsive pleading (e.g., 
complaints, answers, or amended versions thereof). FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1), 12(b). 
 110. See Loren, supra note 108, at 706; see also Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use:  Burden of 
Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1781, 1784 (2010) (“Establishing the 
answers [to the fair use inquiries] requires the fair user both to produce the necessary evidence 
(even where the inquiry is speculative) and to persuade the court that her interpretation of the 
evidence reflects fact (even where the inquiry is subjective).”). 
 111. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(f). 
 112. See Snow, supra note 45, at 9.  In 2010 the Second Circuit explained that issues of 
substantial similarity typically do not require discovery or fact finding because the court need 
only visually compare the works. Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 
F.3d 57, 64 (2d Cir. 2010); see Robert T. Sherwin, Clones, Thugs, ‘n (Eventual?) Harmony:  
Using the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to Simulate a Statutory Defamation Defense and 
Make the World Safe from Copyright Bullies, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 823, 858 (2015). 
 113. See supra Part I.C.1 (discussing fair use’s common-law roots). 
 114. See Oren Bracha, Standing Copyright Law on Its Head?  The Googlization of 
Everything and the Many Faces of Property, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1857 (2007) (describing 
the “open-ended and discretionary character” of fair use as both “meritorious flexibility” and 
a “main cause of its deficiencies”).  In Folsom, Justice Story explained that the fact-specific 
fair use inquiry could not generate “general principles applicable to all cases.” Folsom v. 
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 115. See Jason Mazzone, Administering Fair Use, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 395, 400 
(2009) (calling § 107 “notoriously vague”); Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 277.  Section 107 
is flexible (or vague) by design. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012); see also Sun, supra note 44, at 
136 (explaining the legislative intent that courts were not to apply § 107 as a bright-line rule). 
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factors offer little guidance in practice.116  This vagueness manifests in a 
disconnect between fair use in theory and in practice.117  As a result, fair use 
outcomes are unpredictable.118  Accordingly, fair use has earned some 
unflattering epithets:  “‘disarray,’ ‘in bad shape,’ ‘notoriously vague,’ 
‘nobody knows,’ ‘great white whale of American copyright law,’ ‘protean,’ 
‘difficult—some say impossible—to define,’ ‘confusion,’ ‘guess and pray,’ 
‘mysterious,’ ‘disorderly basket of exceptions,’ ‘precarious,’ ‘nearly 
impossible to predict,’ ‘as vague as possible,’ ‘more fickle than fair,’ and 
‘astonishingly bad.’”119 
The doctrine’s unpredictability and uncertainty potentially chill creativity 
because, without guidance, potential secondary users contemplating using 
copyrighted works are unable to assess their liability.120  Previous fair use 
cases also offer no reliable guidance to secondary users.121  The doctrine’s 
ambiguity also causes risk aversion among copiers, who would prefer to 
license, settle, or refrain from using a work at all to avoid litigation.122  
Because of the prohibitive costs and uncertain outcomes, potential secondary 
users are vulnerable to their own self-censorship.123  In essence, potential 
secondary users might refrain from creating at all, rather than risk liability.124 
Commentators argue that the doctrine’s unpredictability and uncertainty 
are anathema to copyright’s purpose, which is to promote the progress of 
 
 116. See, e.g., Madison, supra note 57, at 391 (“[G]enerations of scholars, judges, and 
lawyers have struggled since [1939] to make sense of fair use, with little success.”); Mazzone, 
supra note 115, at 395 (“Fair use is not working.”). 
 117. See Carroll, supra note 105, at 1122 (calling fair use critical “in brokering expressive 
freedoms among first-generation authors and their successors,” but undermined in practice by 
its uncertainty because “those who produce works for public consumption” are unwilling to 
rely on fair use due to the high costs of “interpreting standards and the financial risks 
associated with relying on fair use”); see also Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 7, at 
1485 (arguing that, in theory, fair use should significantly limit authors’ rights because fair 
use “sanctions private takings of intellectual property without requiring the payment of 
compensation,” but that, in reality, fair use is “more bark than bite” because its “ability to 
shield unauthorized users is greatly undermined by the uncertainty that has become the 
hallmark of the doctrine”). 
 118. Sun, supra note 44, at 136.  The U.S. Copyright Office has an online fair use index:  a 
searchable database of court opinions which attempts to make the principles and applications 
of fair use more accessible and comprehendible. See U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, 
COPYRIGHT.GOV, https://www.copyright.gov/fair-use/ [https://perma.cc/P9TE-AGTC] (last 
updated July 2018). 
 119. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 278–79 (footnotes omitted) (collecting quotations from 
scholarship); see David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 280 (2003) (suggesting that Congress could have “legislated 
a dartboard rather than” the § 107 factors and the result would be the same). 
 120. See Balganesh, supra note 9, at 742–43; Carroll, supra note 105, at 1106; 
Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 277–78. 
 121. See Carroll, supra note 105, at 1102. 
 122. Balganesh, supra note 9, at 743. 
 123. Sun, supra note 44, at 156.  Self-censorship means that users give up their right to fair 
use. Id. 
 124. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 278.  The costs and burdens associated with the 
uncertainty in defending fair use are demonstrated in the story of documentary filmmaker John 
Else. See infra Part I.D.2. 
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knowledge, because uncertainty chills creative activity.125  Consequently, 
many scholars offer proposals to combat fair use’s vagueness and 
uncertainty; these proposals attempt to add guidance to the doctrine by either 
adjusting the fair use analysis or through more drastic changes like taking the 
doctrine away from the courts.126 
Another category of fair use criticism takes issue with the doctrine’s 
treatment as an affirmative defense.  For example, Professor Lydia Pallas 
Loren argues that the placement of the burden to prove or disprove fair use 
may greatly impact the outcome of litigation at various stages and that it is 
misguided to place the burden of production on the defendant.127  For 
example, even the Supreme Court, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,128 
noted that a party raising fair use would have difficulty meeting its burden 
without evidence about relevant markets.129  Because it is more difficult to 
prove the absence of something than it is to prove the presence of the same 
thing, the plaintiff is generally better positioned to supply relevant evidence 
of market harm.130  Moreover, when raised as an affirmative defense, fair use 
deters and chills free speech and expression.131  Finally, which party bears 
the burden of proving or disproving fair use impacts the parties’ settlement 
positions and the behavior of other potential users even before the threat of 
litigation.132  The uncertainty in fair use exaggerates a defendant’s burden of 
proof to the point of “ultimately dictating that the defendant loses.”133 
D.  Understanding Abusive Copyright Litigation 
This Note examines two types of copyright-infringement enforcement, 
defined together as “abusive copyright litigation.”134  The first type of 
abusive enforcement behavior comes from “nonproducing entities,” while 
the second type comes from “producing entities.”  Both of these harm users, 
the courts, and copyright law through their abusive enforcement of copyright 
infringement.135  These entities are not Professor Latman’s “reasonable 
copyright owner[s]” because both nonproducing and producing entities have 
 
 125. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 277–78. 
 126. See infra Part II.A (reviewing proposals to reform fair use). 
 127. Loren, supra note 108, at 691, 706–07. 
 128. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 129. Id. at 590; see Loren, supra note 108, at 707. 
 130. Loren, supra note 108, at 707. 
 131. Id. at 709–10 (arguing that the burden to prove fair use, and knowledge of the burden 
to prove the defense, might “deter speech that would otherwise occur if the burden were 
allocated differently”); see Snow, supra note 110, at 1791–92 (arguing that fair use chills 
speech when treated as an affirmative defense).  Furthermore, when a secondary use involves 
speech, fair use essentially requires the speaker to prove he has a right to speak. See Loren, 
supra note 108, at 709 (“Many fair uses involve speech activities.”); see also Snow, supra 
note 110, at 1793–95. 
 132. See Loren, supra note 108, at 691; Snow, supra note 110, at 1791–92. 
 133. Snow, supra note 110, at 1791. 
 134. This Note examines the two types of abusive copyright litigation together because 
they have similar relationships to the fair use doctrine and because they cause similar harms. 
 135. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 138. 
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the capability and means to enforce copyrights that the “reasonable copyright 
owner” might not.136 
1.  Nonproducing Entities 
The first type of abusive copyright litigation comes from nonproducing 
entities.137  Nonproducing entities can afford to unreasonably enforce 
copyright infringement because it is their sole source of revenue.  
Nonproducing entities intentionally abuse copyright’s enforcement 
mechanisms by acquiring copyright ownership solely to enforce 
infringement and threaten litigation to extract damages or force settlement.138  
These entities are “nonproducing” because they do not produce 
copyrightable content.139  For example, Righthaven LLC, an “enforcement 
firm,” partnered with newspapers to enforce copyrights against online users, 
usually “unsophisticated individuals and nonprofits,” who either fully or 
partially copied news articles or photos.140  Righthaven threatened litigation 
but offered to settle with infringers for an amount between $1,000 and 
$5,000.141 
Nonproducing entities are increasingly problematic.142  Their strategies 
are technically legal under the current law, but they seek damages for 
copyright infringement to generate revenue, not to deter future 
infringement.143  By simply filing an action in federal court, nonproducing 
 
 136. See supra note 56 and accompanying text; see also LATMAN, supra note 56, at 15. 
 137. Nonproducing entities are also called nonpracticing or nonperforming entities. See 
Balganesh, supra note 9, at 732.  Colloquially, they are usually called “copyright trolls.” See 
Copyright Troll, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining “copyright troll” as “[a] 
person, usu[ally] an entity, that acquires . . . the right to sue infringers of [a copyright]”).  The 
term copyright troll follows from patent law, where “nonpracticing entity” refers to “patent 
trolls.” See Nonpracticing Entity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A person or 
company that acquires patents with no intent to use, further develop, produce, or market the 
patented invention.  When a nonpracticing entity focuses on aggressively or opportunistically 
enforcing the patent against alleged infringers, it is also termed (pejoratively) a patent troll.”).  
This Note only discusses “nonproducing entities” in copyright. 
 138. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 58–59.  A nonproducing entity either threatens 
“litigation to force a large monetary settlement or instead proceeds to litigate its rights with 
the sole objective of obtaining damages from a defendant.” Balganesh, supra note 9, at 732. 
 139. Nonproducing entities do not create, distribute, or use creative expression (i.e., 
copyrightable material). See id. 
 140. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 55–56. 
 141. Id. at 56.  Scholars have investigated the potential benefits of nonproducing entities. 
See, e.g., id. at 71–72, 75 (concluding, however, that the costs of the nonproducing-entity 
business model will outweigh any potential benefits). 
 142. See Brad A. Greenberg, Copyright Trolls and the Common Law, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
BULL. 77, 77 (2015); Matthew Sag, Copyright Trolling, an Empirical Study, 100 IOWA L. REV. 
1105, 1145 (2015).  But abusive copyright litigation from nonproducing entities is also not a 
new problem.  In the 1870s, Thomas Wall, the world’s “first copyright troll,” obtained power 
of attorney, often for deceased composers, and extracted the statutory penalty of two pounds 
by threatening infringement actions for unauthorized performances of songs. Greenberg, 
supra note 53, at 63. 
 143. See Balganesh, supra note 9, at 732; Sonmez, supra note 10, at 140.  Enforcing 
copyright infringement solely to extract damages is diametrically antithetical to the purpose 
of copyright protection. See supra Part I.A. 
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entities can force internet service providers to reveal the names and addresses 
of alleged infringers.  The nonproducing entities then send letters threatening 
to pursue statutory damages or offering to settle.144  Even defendants with 
strong fair use defenses are wise to settle given the time, cost, and uncertainty 
of litigation and of defending fair use.145 
2.  Producing Entities 
The second type of abusive copyright litigation comes from producing 
entities.146  Producing entities can afford to unreasonably enforce copyright 
infringement because they are wealthy, smart, and influential.147  Producing 
entities are very different from nonproducing entities because they create, 
produce, or obtain copyrighted content for purposes other than extorting 
litigation settlements.148  Producing entities aggressively enforce copyright 
infringement and chill free speech by claiming excessive protection and 
threatening liability.149  These entities are legitimate copyright owners, such 
as record labels, mass-media companies, and television networks, with 
reputations for aggressively monitoring, threatening, and enforcing both 
 
 144. Greenberg, supra note 142, at 78 (“The letter includes, or is followed with, an offer to 
settle the dispute for somewhere between $1,000 and $5,000, with a frequently used $4,000 
figure ‘calculated to be just below the cost of a bare-bones defense.’” (quoting Ingenuity 13 
LLC v. John Doe, No. 2:12-CV-8333-ODW (JCx), 2013 WL 1898633, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 
6, 2013))); Curran, supra note 11, at 180. 
 145. Greenberg, supra note 53, at 56. 
 146. This Note refers to “producing entities” as entities that actually produce, create, or 
distribute copyrightable content.  In other words, the exact opposite of nonproducing entities. 
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.  Some commentators call this type of copyright 
enforcement “aggressive copyright claims.” See Alfred C. Yen, Eldred, the First Amendment, 
and Aggressive Copyright Claims, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 673, 677 (2003) (explaining that these 
claims “aggressively test the boundaries of copyright” by pursuing claims premised on 
interpreting copyright law to stretch copyright protection beyond the central goal of 
prohibiting reproductions of copyrighted works and that, as a result, these claims are often 
brought against secondary users who added meaningfully to the copyrighted work because 
“[a]t their most extreme, aggressive copyright claims assert that almost any borrowing from a 
copyrighted work constitutes actionable infringement”). 
 147. See Sherwin, supra note 112, at 826–31; see also Sun, supra note 44, at 160 (arguing 
that copyright law is meant to “promote and protect the public welfare,” but that the legislature 
is able to alter copyright law from the “public welfare-oriented” approach “into a copyright 
holder-centric lawmaking process,” offering the recent expansion in copyright protection—
which catered to corporate interests by increasing control over knowledge and information—
as an example of the heavy influence of “copyright-based conglomerates”).  Thus, Haochen 
Sun argues that “the public at large has failed to have its concerns voiced in the copyright 
legislative process or to have them seriously scrutinized by legislators,” partially because 
legislatures focus on individual interests of copyright holders and “pay little attention to the 
need for defending the public’s collective interests in knowledge and information contained 
in copyrighted works.” Sun, supra note 44, at 160. 
 148. See Sherwin, supra note 112, at 832; see also Greenberg, supra note 53, at 59. 
 149. See Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Breathing Space, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 429, 434 
(2007) (describing the chilling effect on fair use expression as “well-documented” and 
“exacerbated by the tendency of copyright owners to take advantage of the uncertainty to 
pursue aggressive copyright claims”). 
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legitimate and nominal copyright infringement.150  Producing entities 
frequently demand large payments “for conduct that either constitutes fair 
use or, even if infringing, does no harm to (and in many cases benefits) the 
value of” the producing entity’s copyrights.151  Producing entities use 
litigation or the threat of litigation to “snuff out . . . fair use.”152  This type of 
abusive copyright litigation harms successful operation of the fair use 
doctrine because even clear fair uses (and therefore future creations) are 
discouraged by threat of heavy enforcement by big companies.153 
For example, in 1990, documentary filmmaker John Else shot a scene 
backstage at the San Francisco Opera, which included a four-and-a-half-
second clip of The Simpsons playing on a television in the corner.154  When 
Else requested approval to include the scene in his film, Fox, the parent 
company, sought a $10,000 licensing fee to use The Simpsons clip.155  Else 
could not afford the fee and replaced the clip in his film.156  But why did Else 
not assert fair use?  Else consulted a lawyer who told him that his use was 
fair use but advised him that asserting fair use was futile because Fox would 
“depose and litigate [him] within an inch of [his] life.”157 
3.  The Causes and Effects of Abusive Copyright Litigation 
Several weaknesses in copyright law facilitate both types of abusive 
copyright litigation.158  First, the divisibility of exclusive rights under the 
 
 150. See Sherwin, supra note 112, at 825, 832, 864 (calling these sophisticated entities 
“copyright thugs” and bullies with track records of using the courts and the threat of litigation 
to get their way). 
 151. Id. at 832 (associating this behavior with Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss’s “‘if value, 
then right’ theory of intellectual property:  [i]f value exists, then someone must have a right to 
that value, and that value will be extracted no matter what” (quoting Rochelle Cooper 
Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990))). 
 152. Sherwin, supra note 112, at 864. 
 153. See id. at 826–32 (describing stories of people bullied out of fair uses); see also Sun, 
supra note 44, at 157–58 (explaining that many copyright owners use aggressive litigation 
strategies to deter the public from asserting its fair use right and that many copyright holders 
take advantage of the user’s burden to prove fair use by bringing infringement actions even in 
cases of strong fair use, doing so hoping “that the user would refrain from the use rather than 
spend resources in his defense”). 
 154. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 95–96. 
 155. Id. at 96–97.  Fox is a producing entity because it owns the copyright to The Simpsons 
for reasons other than to generate revenue by enforcing infringement. 
 156. Id. at 97 (describing the situation as Else not having the “money to buy the right to 
replay what was playing on the television backstage at the San Francisco Opera”). 
 157. Id. at 98–99.  Professor Lessig explains that when lawyers hear Else’s story their 
immediate response is “fair use.” Id. at 97.  Else gave four reasons why he could not “rely on 
[fair use] in any concrete way”:  network-mandated insurance, the uncertainty of defending 
fair use, the futility of opposing Fox, and film deadlines and budget. Id. at 98–99. 
 158. Balganesh, supra note 9, at 738 (finding it “surprising” that it took almost thirty years 
for copyright trolls to emerge, and unsurprising that when they did, “courts and defendants 
had few mechanisms” to curb them); see id. at 726 (“[C]opyright law has long enabled 
behavior that is only today pejoratively described as ‘trolling.’”); see also Greenberg, supra 
note 53, at 61 (noting that nonproducing entities rely “on several provisions of copyright law 
that are vulnerable to exploitation”). 
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Copyright Act of 1976 confers standing to enforce infringement on any 
owner or licensee.159  Second, exploitative revenue-driven copyright 
enforcement is possible because copyright law functions on economic 
incentives.160  Nonproducing entities take advantage of the monopoly but are 
not incentivized to create—in fact, they do not create at all.161  Finally, 
abusive copyright litigation is possible in part because of the uncertainty in 
the fair use doctrine.162  The inherent uncertainty causes many would-be 
users—unable to determine whether their use would qualify as fair use—to 
refrain from creating at all.163  Thus, fair use’s vagueness facilitates abusive 
litigation strategies from entities who are aware of the impact of this 
vagueness on risk-averse users.164  These strategies harm copyright law. 
Abusive copyright litigation contravenes copyright’s central goals, deters 
future creation, chills free speech, and burdens courts.165  Many users decide 
to not make fair use of copyrighted works because of the “visible coercion” 
that a copyright owner might enforce infringement against them, which is, in 
part, the result of many copyright owners who exaggerate the scope of their 
rights to prevent users from making fair uses of their works.166  When the 
costs attending the incentive to create are detached from the costs to enforce 
against infringement, copyright’s balance is disrupted.167  This coercion also 
extends to the public at large.168 
 
 159. Balganesh, supra note 9, at 726–27 (explaining that the Act recognized multiple 
ownerships of a single work, which allows “each owner to hold a narrowly defined and limited 
set of rights”). 
 160. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 138. 
 161. See Curran, supra note 11, at 175–76.  In addition, the sheer volume of copyrights 
lacking any commercial value, and the fact that statutory damages for infringement can 
overcompensate owners of valueless copyrights, further exacerbates the potential for abuse. 
See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 62. 
 162. See Sun, supra note 44, at 158. 
 163. See id. (“Users become afraid of being sued because of the significant time, energy, 
and financial cost of litigation.”). 
 164. See Balganesh, supra note 9, at 742 (illustrating how the fair use doctrine was useless 
to defendants sued by Righthaven, and how the doctrine facilitated Righthaven’s strategy); 
see also Sun, supra note 44, at 157 (explaining the opportunity for abusive litigation strategy 
because copyright holders take “advantage of the user’s burden to prove fair use” and often 
bring claims against users with strong fair use defenses). 
 165. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 55 (explaining that abusive copyright litigation 
“threatens to impose heavy costs on society, particularly by chilling speech and discouraging 
innovation”); Sonmez, supra note 10, at 149–50.  Nonproducing entities disrupt the copyright 
mechanism by exploiting the incentives for authorship without actually “contributing to the 
creative works market.” Greenberg, supra note 53, at 57 n.15.  This practice also discourages 
future creators. See id. 
 166. See Sun, supra note 44, at 157–59 (explaining that publishers often do this through 
notices in books, or by stating that users may only use a certain limited number of lines, and 
that publishers “have turned a blind eye to the fair use doctrine”). 
 167. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 140 (“[W]hen the incentive and the cost to create a work 
are separated from the right to prosecute infringement of the work, there is no counterbalance 
to whether a copyright holder should prosecute the infringement.  If exacting statutory 
penalties for infringement comes with little cost . . . then prosecuting every instance of 
infringement, even every potential infringement, becomes highly rewarding for the entity that 
holds the right to sue for it.”); see also supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
 168. See Sun, supra note 44, at 158–59. 
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II.  ISOLATED SOLUTIONS TO CONNECTED PROBLEMS:  REFORMS TARGET 
EITHER FAIR USE OR ABUSIVE COPYRIGHT LITIGATION 
This Note highlights two distinct but connected problems facing modern 
copyright law:  the fair use doctrine and abusive copyright litigation.  Thus 
far, proposals for reform separately target one or the other.  A review of these 
proposals reveals that both approaches recommend significant changes or 
involve new parties.  This Part first discusses a variety of proposed reforms 
to fair use and then explains some of the proposed approaches to dealing with 
abusive copyright litigation. 
A.  The Current State of Fair Use Reform 
In 1939, the Second Circuit called the fair use doctrine “the most 
troublesome in the whole law of copyright.”169  Current scholarship suggests 
that fair use is not any less troublesome today.170  The wealth of scholarship 
targeted at strengthening the doctrine is unsurprising given the importance of 
fair use to copyright law.171  A common trend among reform proposals is the 
disconnect between fair use in theory and in practice.172  The first category 
of fair use reform focuses on reform through judges and the courts by 
targeting the way judges apply the doctrine.  This category is standards 
driven.173  The second category focuses on reform in the legislative or 
administrative realm.  This category is rules driven.174  There is also a third 
category of reform which argues that the problem is the characterization of 
fair use as an affirmative defense. 
Proponents of judge- and court-focused reform argue that the courts “are 
the most natural venue for fair use reform” because judges created and 
developed fair use.175  One commentator says, put simply, that fair use is 
safer in judges’ hands because they are most likely to guard it.176  Judge- and 
court-focused proposals also argue that the federal courts are the best place 
 
 169. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939). 
 170. See Sun, supra note 44, at 136. 
 171. See Samuelson, supra note 63, at 2540 (noting the common criticisms of fair use, 
including the unpredictability accompanying the “fact-intensive, case-by-case nature” of the 
analysis and the lack of consensus among judges on fair use’s underlying principles). 
 172. See LESSIG, supra note 8, at 99.  Professor Lessig argues that fair use “has the right 
aim” but that “practice has defeated the aim” because fair use cannot function properly. Id.  
The theory—“fair use means you need no permission”—“supports free culture and insulates 
against a permission culture.” Id.  The practice—a combination of fair use’s “fuzzy lines” and 
“the extraordinary liability if [the] lines are crossed”—“means that the effective fair use for 
many types of creators is slight.” Id. 
 173. See Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 280–82. 
 174. See id. at 282.  However, Michael Carroll’s proposal to create a “Fair Use Board” is 
an exception to the rule-driven categorization because Carroll rejects a “rule-like” approach 
to fair use. Carroll, supra note 105, at 1090–92. 
 175. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 322 (noting that judges “gave us fair use in the first 
place”); see supra Part I.C.1 (discussing fair use’s common-law history). 
 176. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 341 (“At the very least, [judges] will not do any worse 
than Congress.”). 
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to reform copyright law.177  They note that courts are a better place to reform 
fair use because legislative reform through Congress is unrealistic.178  
Congress, they argue, will not welcome fair use reform.179  Judicial proposals 
to reform fair use include using “policy-relevant clusters” to supplement the 
four-factor analysis;180 applying a double standard of review and one-sided 
application on summary judgment favoring defendants;181 and encouraging 
courts to consider additional factors beyond the four listed in § 107.182 
The second set of reforms require congressional action.183  These 
proposals argue that rules and administrative agencies can better guide 
secondary users.184  They also argue that courts are slow to change whereas 
Congress can make changes in response to specific problems.185  Legislative 
and administrative proposals include rewriting § 107;186 creating a new 
administrative agency to handle fair use;187 establishing fair use harbors;188 
 
 177. See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(interpreting copyright law to accomplish copyright reform); Pamela Samuelson, Is Copyright 
Reform Possible?, 126 HARV. L. REV. 740, 766 (2013) (book review) (explaining that 
copyright reform is possible without congressional input and that fair use reform “would 
involve judicial interpretation of rules that the copyright statute either does not address or that 
Congress has seemingly chosen to leave to common law interpretation”); Shahshahani, supra 
note 5, at 274 (“[F]ederal courts are more hospitable than Congress to pro-user fair use reform, 
and that doctrinal scholarship is more fruitful than proposing ideal-type legislation.”). 
 178. Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 274, 319 (analyzing the political economy of copyright 
legislation and calling proposals requiring congressional action to limit copyright owners’ 
power “unrealistic”); see id. at 312–13 (arguing that recent fair use legislation demonstrates 
that “Congress is in no way inclined to support legislation that would strengthen fair use or 
otherwise improve the position of users and second-generation creators vis-à-vis content 
owners”). 
 179. Id. at 319 (arguing that evidence shows “that if Congress acts at all, it would likely be 
to increase the power of copyrightholders vis-à-vis users and second-generation creators,” and 
that any congressional reform of fair use would be “either nonexistent or counterproductive”). 
 180. See Samuelson, supra note 63, at 2541–43 (proposing to complement the fair use 
analysis with common patterns in fair use case law which will help predict whether a particular 
use is likely to be fair use). 
 181. See Snow, supra note 45, at 2–3, 46 (urging courts to construe fair use as a question 
of fact for the jury, to grant fair use as a matter of law in limited circumstances, and to grant 
summary judgment only in favor of fair users). 
 182. See Samuelson, supra note 63, at 2540–41 (listing proposed additional factors, such 
as “the likelihood of market failure, the plaintiff’s rationale for insisting [on a license], chilling 
effects on free speech, chilling effects on innovation, the impact of network effects, whether 
the defendant’s use was reasonable and customary in her field of endeavor, [the age of the 
work], distributive values, and even the fairness of the use” (footnotes omitted)). 
 183. See Shahshahani, supra note 5, at 274. 
 184. See id. at 274, 280. 
 185. See Madison, supra note 57, at 395. 
 186. See id. at 396–97 (proposing to rewrite § 107 to address its “emptiness”). 
 187. See Mazzone, supra note 115, at 399, 412–37 (proposing to regulate fair use through 
an administrative agency which would enforce legislation, issue regulations, bring 
enforcement actions, and adjudicate fair use disputes through administrative law judges). 
 188. See Parchomovsky & Goldman, supra note 7, at 1488, 1508–18 (proposing the 
replacement of the fair use standard with rules called “fair use harbors,” which declare certain 
uses presumptively legal, providing users with certainty).  For example, any literary work 
containing more than one hundred words could be copied without permission. Id. at 1511. 
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and creating a “Fair Use Board” within the U.S. Copyright Office and 
granting it the power to declare a particular use fair use.189 
The third category of fair use reform proposes removing fair use’s 
affirmative defense label.  This category argues that fair use should neither 
be labeled nor applied as an affirmative defense.  Instead, these proposals 
argue that fair use should be considered either a mere defense,190 or as an 
individual,191 user,192 or collective user right.193 
In support, proponents of this approach argue that treating fair use as an 
affirmative defense “reduces users’ right to fair use to ‘the right to hire a 
lawyer to defend [one’s] right to create.’”194  First, because the plaintiff’s 
initial burden is minimal, fair use as an affirmative defense prematurely shifts 
the burden to the defendant.195  Second, the application of fair use as an 
affirmative defense increases the costs “for the public to exercise its fair use 
right.”196  Third, the modern pleading standard intensifies defendants’ 
burden, making a fair use defense procedurally and financially prohibitive, 
easily costing six figures in attorney’s fees.197  Because of the uncertainty, 
costs, and time needed to defend fair use, many defendants, even those with 
strong fair use claims, are essentially forced to settle.198  This reality calls 
into question “whether a user’s fair use right can still be adequately 
protected.”199  Finally, the heightened First Amendment concerns associated 
with treating fair use as an affirmative defense further support “treating fair 
use as part of the inquiry into infringement [and] not as a separate inquiry to 
be undertaken after the plaintiff has demonstrated more than de minimis 
copying.”200 
 
 189. See Carroll, supra note 105, at 1090–91, 1123, 1148 (proposing a Fair Use Board 
within the U.S. Copyright Office to decide fair use petitions). 
 190. See Loren, supra note 108, at 688, 699 (advocating for fair use as “a mere defense that 
shapes the scope of a copyright owner’s rights” and advising the Supreme Court to reconsider 
and reject treating fair use as an affirmative defense).  Under this approach, the pleading 
requirement disappears, “an omission of the defense from the answer would not preclude 
consideration of the doctrine by the court,” and, most significantly, the four factors in § 107 
“would become part of the analysis of whether or not the defendant’s actions constitute[d] an 
infringement.” Id. at 711. 
 191. See generally Snow, supra note 45 (advocating fair use as a right). 
 192. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 3, at 4, 36–39 (following examples in Israel and Canada 
and advocating a user-rights approach to fair use). 
 193. See Sun, supra note 44, at 130 (defining fair use as a “collective right held by the 
public to facilitate and enhance participation in communicative actions”). 
 194. Id. at 156 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting LESSIG, supra note 8, at 
187). 
 195. See Loren, supra note 108, at 688 (explaining that the burden shifts to the defendant 
“with little needed from the plaintiff to demonstrate a prima facie case of infringement, thus 
opening the door to the wide range of remedies permissible under the Copyright Act”). 
 196. Sun, supra note 44, at 156. 
 197. Loren, supra note 108, at 688; Sun, supra note 44, at 155. 
 198. See Sun, supra note 44, at 156; see also LESSIG, supra note 8, at 187. 
 199. Sun, supra note 44, at 156. 
 200. Loren, supra note 108, at 710; see Snow, supra note 8, at 137 (tracing the history of 
fair use “from a speech right that defined the contours of copyright to an exception that excuses 
infringement”); Sun, supra note 44, at 156. 
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Advocates of considering fair use as a right, or as a mere, nonaffirmative 
defense, offer several sources of support.  First, scholars argue that this 
conception is supported by fair use’s history and that fair use has long been 
used to protect the rights of fair users.201  Second, they highlight the 
interaction between § 107 and § 106 (which sets forth the exclusive rights of 
copyright owners) to suggest that fair use should not operate as an affirmative 
defense; § 106 explains that a copyright owner’s rights are subject to § 107 
and § 107 specifies that it applies notwithstanding § 106.202  Furthermore, 
reading fair use as a right also makes sense procedurally both from a 
historical perspective (as this reflects how judges applied fair use203) and 
currently because the party seeking relief typically bears the burden of 
persuasion.204  Third, the legislative history of the 1976 Act did not label fair 
use as an affirmative defense and did not intend to place the burden of 
proving fair use on the defendant.205  Commentators argue that the Campbell 
Court was wrong to cite the House report on the 1992 amendments to the 
Copyright Act to support labeling fair use an affirmative defense because the 
report is not authoritative with respect to the 1976 Act.206  Finally, there is 
procedural support against treating fair use as an affirmative defense.207 
Judges have also opined on the proper treatment of fair use.  For example, 
in 2001 the Eleventh Circuit began a fair use analysis by arguing in a footnote 
that fair use should be considered an affirmative right under the 1976 Act, 
and not a mere affirmative defense, pointing out that this view comported 
with the Act’s definition of fair use because fair use is “not a violation of 
copyright.”208  In 2004, Judge Dennis Jacobs on the Second Circuit explained 
 
 201. Snow, supra note 8, at 137, 169 (“Treating fair use as an affirmative defense, courts 
require fair users to demonstrate that their use should be protected. . . .  Compared to its past 
status as a right, fair use has weakened significantly.” (footnotes omitted)); Sun, supra note 
44, at 156. 
 202. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (2012); Loren, supra note 108, at 697–98; see also Snow, 
supra note 8, at 164. 
 203. See Snow, supra note 8, at 142–55. 
 204. See Loren, supra note 108, at 691, 697, 705–09; see also Snow, supra note 8, at 164. 
 205. See Loren, supra note 108, at 688, 699–702, 711; see also id. at 685 (“[T]he legislative 
history cuts against viewing fair use as an affirmative defense, and the legislative history 
explicitly confirms what the statute clearly states:  Congress did not intend fair use to be an 
affirmative defense.”); Snow, supra note 8, at 162, 165–66. 
 206. See, e.g., Loren, supra note 108, at 703–04, 711 (arguing that the legislative history 
intended fair use to evolve to “address new uses on a case-by-case basis,” and that it did not 
permit the Court to “fundamentally alter the nature” of the fair use doctrine because it was 
improper to treat fair use as “requiring the defendant [to] bear the burden of proof concerning 
important factors that inform” fair use (i.e., the evaluation of whether the defendant’s conduct 
was unlawful)). 
 207. See Snow, supra note 8, at 165–66 (arguing that, because it is easier for the copyright 
holder to satisfy the burden of production, that burden should lie with the plaintiff and not the 
defendant); see also Loren, supra note 108, at 691 (“Given that the prima facie case of 
infringement already requires the plaintiff demonstrate that the copying by the defendant was 
‘improper,’ it seems that whether a use is fair or not would constitute a necessary or extrinsic 
element of the plaintiff’s cause of action.  Further, . . . the copyright owner often has better 
access to relevant evidence on the fair use factors.”). 
 208. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1260 n.3 (11th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1542 n.22 (11th Cir. 1996)).  In Bateman, 
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that fair use does not exist by tolerance; instead it is “a right—codified in 
§ 107 and recognized since shortly after the Statute of Anne [of 1709].”209 
B.  Solutions to Abusive Copyright Litigation 
To combat abusive copyright litigation, scholars and judges have offered 
solutions to thwart the “disingenuous efforts of various trolls by promoting 
accountability in copyright enforcement while restoring the framers’ original 
intent to the Copyright Act.”210  Like proposals to reform fair use, proposals 
to quell abusive copyright litigation focus on either judicial solutions or 
legislative solutions.211 
Proponents of targeting abusive copyright litigation through legislation 
argue that Congress is best positioned for a long-term solution and that 
congressional action provides uniform and systematic legal change to wholly 
disrupt the nonproducing entity business model.212  These proposals also note 
that Congress has other constitutional powers regarding copyright213 and that 
the Supreme Court is deferential to Congress’s copyright decisions.214  Two 
common approaches are limiting statutory damages215 and denying 
joinder.216 
In the courts, one popular procedural tactic against abusive copyright 
litigation is Rule 11 sanctions.217  Defendants and courts can use sanctions 
to threaten nonproducing entities and ensure that they only file claims against 
actual infringement, or not at all.218  Because litigation is a nonproducing 
entity’s sole source of revenue, the threat and use of sanctions is likely to 
have a meaningful impact on nonproducing entities.219  Increasing the use of 
sanctions can also deter other copyright owners from using abusive tactics.220  
Courts are increasingly open to punishing nonproducing entities’ litigation 
 
Judge Stanley Birch stated that, in his opinion, fair use is better and more logically viewed as 
a right granted by the 1976 Act because under the Act fair use is never infringement, so it need 
not be excused. 79 F.3d at 1542 n.22. 
 209. NXIVM Corp. v. Ross Inst., 364 F.3d 471, 485 (2d Cir. 2004) (Jacobs, J., concurring). 
 210. Curran, supra note 11, at 194. 
 211. Most proposals target copyright “trolling.” See supra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 212. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156–57 (“[C]ourts should not be responsible for tracking 
and managing trolling’s future incarnations.”). 
 213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 214. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 208 (2003) (stating that the Court was not 
at liberty to second-guess Congress in matters of copyright policy); Sony Corp. of Am. v. 
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
 215. See, e.g., Balganesh, supra note 9, at 736–39. 
 216. See, e.g., id. at 733; Sag, supra note 142, at 1141; Curran, supra note 11, at 201. 
 217. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156; see FED. R. CIV. P. 11.  An attorney can be sanctioned 
for violating the pleading requirements under Rule 11. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)–(c). 
 218. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 155–56. 
 219. See id. 
 220. Gregory S. Mortenson, Note, BitTorrent Copyright Trolling:  A Pragmatic Proposal 
for a Systemic Problem, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1105, 1134 (2013).  Sanctions also generate 
revenue for courts. Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156. 
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tactics.221  For example, the court in Malibu Media, LLC v. John Does 1–
16,222 warned that if the plaintiff could not sustain their claims, the 
defendants would have adequate remedies to recover their litigation expenses 
or damages like Rule 11 sanctions.223  Importantly, the Supreme Court has 
upheld Rule 11 sanctions in a copyright infringement case.224  In Business 
Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enterprises,225 the Court upheld 
the district court’s award of sanctions against the plaintiff and its attorney, 
whose claim lacked any evidentiary support of copyright infringement.226  In 
upholding the sanctions, the Court held that “Rule 11 imposes an objective 
standard of reasonable inquiry on represented parties who sign papers or 
pleadings.”227 
The several examples of judges crafting their own solutions to abusive 
copyright litigation further support targeting the problem through courts.  In 
2010, a Nevada district court granted a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss—
alleging fair use—against Righthaven.228  After analyzing the fair use 
factors, the court concluded that the defendant’s use was fair use because it 
was informational, used “only the first eight sentences of a thirty sentence 
news article,” and that the use was unlikely to impact the market for the 
original work.229  In 2011, thanks again to the District of Nevada, Righthaven 
was ordered to show cause why it should not be sanctioned for its flagrant 
misrepresentation to the court.230 
III.  KILL TWO COPYWRONGS WITH ONE RIGHT 
Thus far, scholars have separately targeted the two problems outlined in 
Part II—the fair use doctrine’s uncertainty and abusive copyright litigation.  
This Note argues, however, that the problems are connected and should be 
solved together.  John Else’s story demonstrates why.  Despite knowing that 
his clip was likely fair use, Else also knew he could not actually rely on the 
fair use doctrine to quickly excuse him from liability.231  Thus, Else’s story 
demonstrates how even secondary users who are confident that their use is 
fair use are still deterred from creating because of the uncertainty of asserting 
the affirmative defense.  Moreover, Fox’s ability to request a $10,000 
licensing fee for the clip is related to the fair use burden because if Else 
needed the scene or had $10,000 to spare, the abusive outcome in his story 
 
 221. See COPYRIGHT LITIGATION HANDBOOK § 3:15 (2d ed. 2017) (“[C]ourts are losing 
patience with ‘copyright trolls.’”). 
 222. 902 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Pa. 2012). 
 223. Id. at 702–03. 
 224. See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 534–35 (1991). 
 225. 498 U.S. 533. 
 226. Id. at 554. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Righthaven LLC v. Realty One Grp., Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1036-LRH-PAL, 2010 WL 
4115413, at *3 (D. Nev. Oct. 19, 2010). 
 229. Id. at *2. 
 230. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 978–79 
(D. Nev. 2011). 
 231. LESSIG, supra note 8, at 98–99; see supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
2018] A FAIR USE TO REMEMBER 727 
would have been an extracted settlement rather than what it was—the chilling 
and discouraging of creative activity. 
Fair use reform has a long history but no conclusive solution.  Instead of 
targeting the analysis, a solution should focus on the application.  This 
proposal substantially and positively impacts defendants and fair users and 
minimally impacts legitimate copyright owners.  Placing a higher burden on 
bringing infringement actions decreases the incentive to litigate abusively.  
There are several benefits of this proposal.  First, it requires less change than 
other proposals and primarily impacts the party first pleading fair use.  Other 
solutions propose drastic change or require government and congressional 
action, or ask judges to modify their approach to fair use.232  Second, this 
proposal still allows other proposals to be tested within the fair use analysis.  
This Note’s proposal does not fix every problem, and although other 
solutions may still be necessary, this proposal targets the problem at its core 
while still enabling other proposals to be tested simultaneously. 
This Note suggests that the best way to kill two “copywrongs”—the fair 
use doctrine and abusive copyright litigation—is with the one “right” of fair 
use.  Applying fair use as a right will alleviate some of the doctrine’s 
problems and mitigate abusive litigation all while simultaneously protecting 
the courts and users by eliminating many of the major legal and procedural 
barriers.  Under this proposal, abusive copyright litigation will decline and 
hopefully cease.  Part III.A explains the historical and practical feasibility of 
this solution.  Then Part III.B discusses the practical impact of the solution 
and why applying fair use as a right can have the specific and desirable 
impact of decreasing abusive copyright litigation. 
A.  Fair Use Is, and Must Be, a Right 
Treating fair use as a right is the best way to limit using the doctrine for 
abusive copyright litigation.  Several of the criticisms and problems currently 
attributed to fair use are minimized or eliminated by treating fair use as a 
right.  So far, fair use is the best way to carry out copyright’s goals, which is 
why the doctrine itself should not be changed.  In other words, this proposal 
seeks to merely change fair use’s label from “affirmative defense” to “right.” 
Treating fair use as a right is supported both historically and 
conceptually.233  The legislative history, text of § 107, and actual practice 
point to conceptualizing fair use as a right or, at the very least, not an 
affirmative defense.234  Unlike other proposals, this Note offers a solution 
that requires the least change and preserves judges’ control over fair use.  
This proposal also maintains fair use’s flexibility and applicability across 
copyright cases.  Fair use should remain in the hands of judges because 
judges invented, developed, and know how to apply the doctrine.235  This 
proposal does not increase judges’ tasks, and they might even appreciate 
 
 232. See generally supra Part II. 
 233. See supra Part II.A. 
 234. See supra Part II.A. 
 235. See supra Part II.A. 
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analyzing fair use in fewer cases.236  Many of the common criticisms of and 
problems with the fair use doctrine are minimized or eliminated by treating 
fair use as a right:  it offers users and defendants more certainty and thus 
chills free speech less often;237 the burden is on the party in the better position 
to plead;238 and there will be fewer forced settlements.239  In addition, other 
proposals, for example judicial solutions to abusive copyright litigation, 
solve only one aspect of what is clearly a connected problem.240 
This proposal cannot eliminate every inherent uncertainty accompanying 
fair use, but it can provide secondary users and defendants with more 
certainty because plaintiffs must plead that the use was not fair, which gives 
defendants an idea of their liability.  Potential secondary users will be less 
deterred when deciding to create given the increased certainty of not being 
found liable if they have a strong fair use case, because plaintiffs’ minimal 
burden will deter filing claims against strong cases of fair use.  The current 
conception of fair use makes it too difficult for defendants asserting fair use 
to successfully defend it or, more specifically, to show fair use early in the 
litigation process.241  By its very nature, fair use necessitates a fact-intensive 
inquiry.  Yet not every case deserves the time required to apply fair use.  
Under this proposal, part of the time and expense pleading fair use is now 
transferred to the party bringing the claim.  Defendants with stronger fair use 
claims have greater certainty that the case will not be brought or can be 
dismissed earlier, so defendants will not be forced to incur the costs of 
litigation and will not be forced to settle or be deterred from creating. 
B.  Litigating—or Hopefully Not—the Right of Fair Use 
Fair use should be considered and decided as early as possible in litigation 
and should not be used as a catalyst for abusive copyright litigation.  This 
section will demonstrate the positive impact and lack of downsides of this 
proposal.  First, it is worth noting the different desired outcomes for 
nonproducing and producing entities.  This proposal seeks to eliminate 
claims brought by nonproducing entities entirely because they are wholly 
antithetical to copyright law.  But eliminating claims brought by producing 
entities would be neither a realistic nor a desirable outcome.  Producing 
entities are essential to copyright law; they often protect authors who could 
not create commercially or distribute without the assistance of a large 
producing entity.  For example, the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA) can still protect artists by helping them monitor and enforce 
 
 236. See supra Part II.A. 
 237. See Snow, supra note 110, at 1798 (arguing that placing the burden of proving fair 
use on the defendant makes no legal sense, especially compared with the strong interest in 
protecting speech). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See supra Part I.C.4. 
 240. See supra Part II.B. 
 241. See supra Part II.A. 
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legitimate copyright claims.242  This proposal seeks only to remove or 
decrease the incentive for producing entities to file abusive copyright 
litigation by slightly increasing their burden.  The impact on producing 
entities should be minimal because infringement actions against strong fair 
use cases should almost never be brought.  More importantly, would-be 
secondary users should neither be deterred from creating nor fear the overly 
litigious power of producing entities. 
Treating fair use as a right will minimize abusive copyright litigation at 
several stages.  First, abusive copyright litigation will decrease at the 
pleading stage.  Second, treating fair use as a right makes other procedural 
devices available during litigation, like Rule 11 sanctions, and summary 
judgment.  Finally, even before a case is filed, treating fair use as a right 
removes the incentive to file cases where the alleged infringement has a 
strong fair use argument.  Taken together, treating fair use as a right will help 
foster a culture where would-be secondary users are not deterred from 
creating by uncertain fears of liability or the threat of abusive enforcement. 
1.  Pleading Fair Use 
This proposal positively impacts three main aspects of pleading fair use:  
the party who must plead the fair use analysis, the standard by which they 
must plead it, and the consequences for failing to state a claim.  Even minimal 
burdens deter abusive copyright litigation.  For example, a complaint cannot 
use boilerplate language.243  If fair use is a right, then the burden to plead that 
a secondary use is not fair use should fall on the plaintiff bringing the alleged 
infringement claim.  To plead a plausible infringement claim, the plaintiff 
must show that the defendant’s use is plausibly not fair use.  Thus, fair use is 
treated as part of the initial inquiry into infringement because it is an aspect 
of the overall consideration of whether the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s 
copyright.  For example, the threat of a potential infringement action by Fox 
would not have had the same deterrent effect on John Else, because Fox, not 
Else, would have borne the initial burden of plausibly pleading that there was 
not fair use to state its claim of infringement.244 
This proposal does not prohibit legitimate copyright owners from 
enforcing infringement of their work because the owner need only plausibly 
plead that the infringing work is not fair use.  The stakes for not considering 
fair use at the pleading stage will hopefully be high enough to deter abusive 
claims because the risks of failing to do so include sanctions and a loss of 
 
 242. See supra Part I.D.2.  The RIAA qualifies as a producing entity because it represents 
recording industry distributors whose business is copyright licensing, not generating revenue 
primarily from litigation. See Greenberg, supra note 53, at 60; see also About RIAA, RIAA, 
http://www.riaa.com/aboutus.php [https://perma.cc/3JY3-BCKE] (last visited Oct. 4, 2018). 
 243. See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
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credibility with the judge.  It is in the claimant’s and his lawyer’s best 
interests to make a good-faith showing of the fair use factors.245 
Because pleading copyright infringement was already a low bar, Twombly 
and Iqbal’s heightened pleading standard currently puts an increased burden 
on defendants asserting fair use, while the rationale for the pleading standard 
does not have the same positive impact on plaintiffs in copyright 
infringement cases.246  This is especially true in fair use cases because the 
burden to plead prima facie copyright infringement is low.247  However, by 
applying fair use as a right, the heightened pleading standard can function 
fairly.  The plaintiff must still make a prima facie showing of copyright 
infringement and must plausibly plead that the defendant’s alleged 
infringement is not fair use; the plaintiff is already in the best position to 
make the initial showing that a defendant’s use is not fair.248  And even if an 
abusive copyright litigation case is filed, it will still be easier to dismiss 
earlier using a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.249  Motions to dismiss for failure to 
state a copyright infringement claim—for failure to plausibly plead that 
defendant’s use was not fair use—would not unduly burden legitimate 
plaintiffs.250 
2.  Rule 11 Sanctions 
Under the conception of fair use as a right, when an attorney must affirm 
that he has filed a legitimate claim, he can only do so after considering 
whether the use was fair use.  Courts and defendants should use Rule 11 
sanctions to threaten known nonproducing entities because sanctions will be 
most effective against the nonproducing-entity business model.251  Because 
nonproducing entities derive revenue solely from litigation or threatening 
litigation, the risk of Rule 11 sanctions for failure to disprove fair use would 
 
 245. For an example of a judge barring any cases from being filed, see Ernesto, Judge 
Threatens to Bar ‘Copyright Troll’ Cases over Lacking IP-Location Evidence, TORRENT 
FREAK (May 12, 2017), https://torrentfreak.com/judge-threatens-to-bar-copyright-troll-cases-
over-lacking-ip-location-evidence-170212/ [https://perma.cc/WPG4-GZT7]. 
 246. See supra notes 107–10 and accompanying text. 
 247. See supra Part I.C.3. 
 248. See Loren, supra note 108, at 705–06 (arguing that there could be more “pre-answer 
dismissals in cases of clear fair use” if it were not treated as an affirmative defense because 
the plaintiff’s claim would not be plausible). 
 249. See David M. Jacobson, The Plausibility Standard Under Twombly and Ashcroft, 
DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Summer 2009), http://files.dorsey.com/files/upload/ 
jacobson_wdtl_article.pdf [https://perma.cc/PWN6-H9J4] (“District courts now have 
significant tools for enforcing Rule 12(b)(6), and defense counsel have a basis to litigate 
motions to dismiss more aggressively.”). 
 250. When assessing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, that is, “[i]n 
evaluating whether a claim has facial plausibility,” district court judges must still “construe 
the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and 
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Weiler v. Draper Chevrolet Co., No. 
12-12402, 2013 WL 388585, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 31, 2013) (quoting Bassett v. NCAA, 528 
F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008)). 
 251. See Sonmez, supra note 10, at 156. 
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neutralize the nonproducing entity’s one-sided economic incentive.252  
Moreover, increasing the use and threat of Rule 11 sanctions would also deter 
producing entities and individual owners from using nonproducing-entity-
like tactics.253 
3.  Before Litigation 
Under this proposal, potential secondary users will become aware of the 
burdens facing plaintiffs who wish to bring infringement actions.  Secondary 
users with stronger fair use arguments will be less deterred by the threat of 
liability because frivolous infringement actions will become less common.  
For example, someone like John Else would actually be able to rely on fair 
use.254  A culture which embraces fair use, and rejects enforcement in the 
face of strong fair use, will cultivate more secondary uses.  Finally, because 
the initial fair use pleading burden would fall on producing and nonproducing 
entities, such entities would be deterred from filing claims in cases with 
stronger fair use arguments.  Both types of entities should decide, when faced 
with strong cases of fair use, that pursuing an enforcement action is not worth 
it.  Would-be secondary users should no longer have to choose between 
creation or liability.255 
CONCLUSION 
This proposal neither attempts nor desires to change the analysis under the 
fair use doctrine.  This Note agrees with those who believe that the fair use 
factors are the best way to produce determinations which are as close as 
possible to an outcome based on the fairness contemplated by § 107.  To 
ensure that the fair use doctrine lives up to its full potential and purpose, it 
should be applied as a right.  Applying fair use as a right is also a long-term 
solution to abusive copyright litigation.  Under this proposal, stronger cases 
of fair secondary uses can be decided earlier or never brought at all.  As the 
barriers to abusive copyright litigation increase, the incentives for abusive 
copyright litigation will decrease. 
 
 252. See supra Part II.B. 
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